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A LESSON FROM THE EAST:
INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS AND THE
U.S.-CAMBODIA TRADE AGREEMENT OF 1999
MICHAEL HECKER'
I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]he powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what
they must.,2
This phrase, written by Thucydides in the 5 th century B.C.,
was meant to demonstrate the power structure in negotiations
between Athens and Melos at the onset of the Peloponnesian War.
3
Centuries later, these words accurately depict the current power
structure of the newly emerging international labor rights regime
where the larger, more developed nations, along with their multi-
national corporations, dominate the world economy and force the
weaker economic states into subservience. As this leveraged power
structure has developed into the status quo, underdeveloped states
have begun to utilize one of their greatest comparative economic
advantages in order to solidify a place in the world economy-
cheap labor.
4
The continuation of the status quo has led to an increase in
the number of labor violations that have gone relatively unchecked,
with regulatory efforts by states being more of an illusion than fact.
As the problem continued to grow, it morphed from a series of
The author graduated with a Bachelor in Arts in 2005 from SUNY Geneseo
and is currently a second year law student at the University at Buffalo Law
School, SUNY (Juris Doctor expected May 2009). The author greatly
acknowledges Professor James Ateleson for his guidance and help in
constructing this article.
2 THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WARS 181 (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
Washington Square Press 1963) (431B.C.), available at 89 http://classic
persuasion.org/pw/thucydides/jthucbk5rv2.htm.
3 See id.
4 See Don Wells, "Best Practice" in the Regulation of International Labor
Standards: Lessons of the U.S.-Cambodia Textile Agreement, 27 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL'Y J. 357 (2006).
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individual violations into something much more substantial;
known today as the "race to the bottom.",5 The goal of the postwar
trade and financial markets of the past fifty years was to avoid a
trend towards this "race to the bottom." 6 However, it seems that
both emerging and developed economies have helped this system
proliferate and flourish way beyond expectation.
When the idea of including labor provisions into trade
agreements first arose, many states questioned if that was the best
idea.7 These opponents argue that the forced imposition of these
sanctions "would result in a negative sum game, since there would
be more losers than winners." 8 They argued that the market, not
individual activist states, is the most effective entity to raise labor
standards. For instance, between 1993 and 1994, 30,000 children
in Bangladesh were released from their textile related jobs due to
pressure by suppliers.9 It was shown that the majority of these
children turned to prostitution, or other more dangerous profes-
sions. 10 As horrific as something like child labor sounds to a
Western economy, many underdeveloped states have accepted
these labor violations as a legitimate means of protecting their
citizens' ability to subsist. However, even with these cultural
differences, as many NGOs and anti-globalization proponents have
taken a stronger, more vocal stance in their calls for a set of
5 See, e.g., Anita Chan, A "Race To The Bottom": Globalisation and China's
labour standards, 46 CHINA PERSP. 41 (2003), available at http://rspas.
anu.edu.au!-anita/pdf/AChancp461.pdf (explaining that the race to the bottom
causes harmful effects, such as reduced wages, in already low-wage industries).
6 See generally Jose E. Alvarez & Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy
-and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 94 (2002).
7 See Yeomin Yoon & Robert W. McGee, Incorporating Labor Standards into
Trade Agreements: An Ethical Analysis, Presentation at the Korea Labor
Institute - Korea America Economic Association Joint Conference (July 9-10,
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-=410362.
8Id at 15.
9 Id. at2.
10 Id.
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homogenous international labor reforms, states have begun to at
least acknowledge the need for more international compliance."
Increasingly, states have begun including labor provisions
against certain enumerated labor rights, such as child and forced
labor restrictions, within their bi-lateral and multi-lateral trade
agreements. 12 However, these provisions often go ignored, or un-
enforced, by state parties. States often view these provisions more
as a way of avoiding negative publicity than accomplishing actual
reform. For example, both the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement
and the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement lack a process to
enforce the minimal obligation of complying with the International
Labor Organization's (ILO) Fundamental Conventions.1 3 For this
reason, the U.S. Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotia-
tions and Trade Policy stated in a report to the U.S. President,
Congress, and the U.S. Trade Representative that these labor pro-
visions were unlikely to "protect the core rights of workers in any
of the countries involved." 14
Many anti-globalization proponents argue that the worsen-
ing international labor scene is due primarily to the developed
Western states that plead ignorance to the problem. They point to
states hiding behind their signatures to international conventions,
such as ILO conventions 87 and 98, as being tell-tale signs of their
true hypocrisy. These strong economic states-most notably the
U.S.-have arguably been the catalyst for the evolution of a failed
international labor rights regime. 15
"Id. at 3.
12 Wells, supra note 4, at 358 (listing the North American Free Trade Agreement
as an example of a regional trade agreement).13 id
"4 Id. at 358-59 (quoting the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Report of
the Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade Policy 1
(2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/
SingaporeFTA/Reports/asset uploadfile77_3220.pdf).
5 See id.
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II. U.S. ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOR RIGHTS REGIME
Since 1993, the U.S. has been incorporating labor rights
into trade agreements with many of its trading partners.' 6 How-
ever, the lack of a true hard power enforcement standard in many
of these agreements has made these provisions quite ineffective. 17
One can speculate many different reasons why the U.S. has
included labor provisions within its bi-lateral agreements without
setting up a legitimate and sound enforcement mechanism.
Generally, it seems that these aims have been targeted at reaching
political goals, rather than substantive. However, one goal seems to
be the most significant with respect to labor rights: the U.S.'s lack
of involvement in the international labor rights regime, and more
specifically, the ILO.
As of March 8 th, 2008, of the 177 ILO member states, only
five states have ratified fewer Fundamental Conventions than the
U.S.: the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Brunei Darus-
salam, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, and the Marshall Islands.' 8
With the ineffectiveness of the U.S.'s trade provisions and its
perceived lack of commitment to the international labor rights
regime, something needed to give. Under the Clinton administra-
tion, the U.S. finally began to try and write a more pro-active
narrative for itself as being an advocate for working people
globally.
Following this change in policy, the U.S. began toying with
ideas on how to more effectively link trade privileges with support
16 See, e.g., Sandra Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights Through Trade Agreements,
10 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 13 (2003) (discussing freedom of association,
collective bargaining, and prohibitions against forced labor and child labor).
17 Wells Wells, supra note 4, at 359 (demonstrating the lack of procedural
process for enforcing labor provisions).
' See Int'l Labor Org. [ILO], Ratifications of the ILO Fundamental Conventions
(Nov.21,2003), available at http://webfusion.ilo.org/public/db/standards/
normes/appllappl-ratif8conv.cfm?Lang=EN (demonstrating that there are eight
Fundamental Conventions that deal with four main topics: forced labor, freedom
of association, discrimination, and child labor).
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for basic labor rights. 19 With these concerns in mind, the U.S.
decided that the best, and most productive, thing to do would be to
construct a new type of trade agreement that effectively answered
all the previous enforcement problems. The foundation of this new
agreement was a positive incentive program that would benefit
states that actively changed their domestic standards to those more
inline with U.S. policy. The U.S. saw this program as potentially
having a two-fold benefit: (1) increasing their international
reputation for upholding labor rights, and (2) acting as a test-run to
determine whether a positive incentive program could be suc-
cessful. The agreement that developed from this idea is the U.S-
Cambodian Trade Agreement (UCTA), which was signed in
1999.
20
III. CAMBODIAN LABOR REGULATION
BEFORE THE UCTA
Before implementation of the UCTA, the Cambodian labor
rights regime was the poster child for corruption and indifference.
At that time, a government labor inspector was making the
equivalent of twenty-eight dollars a month, which was barely
subsistence level.2' In contrast, the average wage in the garment
industry was forty-five dollars a month.22 This means that the few
inspectors who were assigned the task of maintaining labor
compliance were getting paid less than those who they were
monitoring. This economic disparity, combined with a corrupt
government influence, was bound to lead to inspectors who were
more than willing to overlook labor violations for a small fee.23
19 Sandra Polaski, Cambodia Blazes a New Path to Economic Growth and Job
Creation, 51 CARNEGIE PAPERS 1, 4 (Oct. 2004).
20 See Agreement on Trade in Textiles and Textile products, U.S.-Cambodia,
Jan. 20, 1999, Hein's No. KAV 5781, available at http://cambodia.usembassy.
gov/uploads/images/M9rzdrzMKGi6AjfOSIuJRA/uskhtexttile.pdf.
21 Polaski, supra note 19, at 6.
22 id
23 id.
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It was also quite common for most inspectors to have
second and third jobs, which often led to widespread neglect of
their regulatory duties.24 The inspectors who actually did routinely
conduct on-site inspections often took bribes from the factory
owners. Also, it was not uncommon for government officials to
have economic interests in garment enterprises, whether through
partial ownership or due to their ability to collect fees for
necessary paperwork filing and documentation.26 This led to
serious conflicts of interest where many public officials used their
position to ensure limited to no regulation of their factories to
benefit their own bottom line. This lack of transparency and
legitimacy in the Cambodian regulatory regime was far too
insufficient to properly regulate the UCTA.
IV. U.S.-CAMBODIA TRADE AGREEMENT
A. Background
Cambodia is one of the least developed and poorest nations
in the world with approximately thirty-five percent of its citizens
living below the poverty line.27 With seventy-five percent of the
country's economy based on agriculture, there has been little
chance for Cambodia to generate enough domestic revenue to
build an infrastructure that could possibly support more high-tech
jobs.28 In order to spur economic growth, Cambodia decided to
focus its efforts on the garment manufacturing industry.
24 Id.
25 id.
26 Kevin Kolben, Trade, Monitoring, and the ILO: Working To Improve
Conditions in Cambodia's Garment Factories, 7 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEv. L. J.
79, 86 (2004).
27 CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Cambodia: Economy, in THE WORLD
FACTBOOK (2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
geos/cb.html#Econ.
28 Id.
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Historically, garment manufacturing has offered economies
the greatest chance of immediate growth due to the limited amount
of investment and skilled workers needed.29 The government's
hope was that by putting their resources into this industry they
could garner increased foreign investment and upgrade their other
industries, as many other East Asian countries had done over the
past few decades. As of today, the garment industry makes up
almost 80 percent of all of Cambodia's exports and employs sixty-
five percent of its manufacturing workforce. 30  A recent World
Bank survey estimates that the livelihoods of a quarter of
Cambodia's population rely on the garment industry. 3'
Until recently, the global textile manufacturing industry
had been governed for over thirty years by the Multi Fibre
Agreement (MFA).32 The MFA was a domestic safeguard policy
instituted under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in 1974. 33 The MFA permitted developed states to
establish a quota system that limited the amount of goods that
could be exported by any developing state into their domestic
market if they had a reasonable fear that not doing so would cause
their markets to be saturated with manufactured textiles. 34 The
MFA continued on as the standard until 1995 when, at the Uruguay
Round of the World Trade Organizations's (WTO) negotiations,
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was concluded.
Under the ATC, it was determined that the MFA would be phased
29 See Polaski, supra note 19, at 4.
30 ILO, Better Factories Cambodia, Facts and Figures about Cambodia's
Garment Industry (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.betterfactories.org/
content/documents/Facts%20and%2OFigures.pdf.
31 Wells, supra note 4, at 368.
32 Agreement Regarding International Trade in Textiles (Multifibre Agreement),
Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T. 1001 (entered into force on Apr. 1, 1974).
33 Charlene Aprill & Ramon Certeza, Post Multifibre Agreement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Cambodia and South Africa: A Comparative Study 1, 8 (15 Sept.
2006) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, University of Kassel, Berlin School of
Economics), available at http://www.global-labour-university.org/fileadmin/
PapersWitsconference_2007/Group B I /aprilpaper.pdf.
34 id.
2007-2008
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out over the following ten years in order to allow textiles to once
again be regulated under traditional GATT rules.
35
Because Cambodia did not attempt a state-organized
entrance into the textile manufacturing industry until 1991, they
were not originally affected by the MFA.36 As such, Cambodia saw
its ability to flood foreign markets with its products as an
advantage over other quota-limited countries. In the hopes of
capitalizing on this advantage, Cambodia quickly began to develop
its garment industry and was able to realize quick returns.
37
The growth of Cambodia's garment industry led to it being
granted "Most Favored Nation" status in 1996 by the U.S., and
special privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences in
1997. 38  Garment exports to the U.S. grew from almost non-
existent in 1994 to being valued at $308 million dollars in 1998;
representing an increase of over 305% from the previous year.
39
However, due to the rapid increase in the number of Cambodian
goods flooding into the U.S. market, the U.S. government decided
it was time to initiate conversations with Cambodian to incorporate
it into the MFA's quota system.
Meanwhile, as Cambodia's textile industry grew, so did its
workforce. The rapid growth in the workforce caused workers,
who are mainly female, to take the brunt of the growing pains.
40
Workers suddenly began complaining about increasingly intoler-
able working conditions, long hours, and unpaid, forced over-
time.41 Many workers were being paid under the required
Cambodian minimum wage of $40 for a forty-eight hour work
week.42 Workers were denied legally protected rights in violation
of the Cambodian Legal Code and other international
35 Kolben, supra note 26, at 89.
36 See Polaski, supra note 19, at 1.
37 Id. at 4 (explaining that a significant amount of the outside investment came
from Taiwan, China, and South Korea).
38 Wells, supra note 4, at 362.
39 Kolben, supra note 26, at 82.40 Id. at 82.
41 Id. at 83.
42 Id. at 84.
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conventions.43 The workers, tired of these constant abuses, reached
out to American labor unions in search of help.44
In June of 1998, supportive U.S. labor groups petitioned
the Clinton administration to review workers' rights violations in
Cambodia.45 This put the administration in a dilemma: either
ignore the obvious labor right violations or take a pro-active
stance. The U.S. responded by negotiating the UCTA's positive
incentive program as a means of giving in to the domestic labor
pressures, and perhaps, as a way of keeping China's domestic
garment industry from even greater growth.
B. Provisions of the UCTA
The UCTA was originally negotiated for a three year span
between 1999 and 2001 and called for quota limitations on the
twelve largest categories of exports.46 However, if it was found
that Cambodian factories achieved significant compliance with
national and international labor standards, the quotas for all twelve
categories would be increased on an annual basis to a possible cap
of 18%. This meant that by taking action to enforce labor
compliance within their domestic borders, Cambodia could realize
increased economic benefits. For example, because of Cambodia's
success in complying with the agreement's requirements, their
country's garment export quotas with the U.S. were increased
substantially over the first five years of the agreement's course: 9%
in 2000 and 2001, 12% in 2002, 14% in 2003, and 18% in 2004.48
Also, in a revolutionary move, both parties agreed to a
regulatory compliance regime to be handled by a non-interested
43 Id; see also Labor Code Ch. XI (1997) (Cambodia) (outlining the rights to
freedom of association and organize).
44 Kolben, supra note 26, at 84.
45 Polaski, supra note 19, at 4.
46 Id
47 See Lejo Sibbel & Petra Borrmann, Linking Trade with Labor Rights: The
ILO Better Factories Cambodia Project, 24 Ariz J. Int'l & Comp. L. 235, 237
(2007).
48 Wells, supra note 4, at 363.
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third party.49 It was determined that domestic efforts had proven to
be too ineffective and that outside inspection would be too costly.
After a long discussion, the two states decided that the best
organization capable of taking on such a role would be the ILO. °
The ILO offered something most regulatory schemes cannot, and
something deemed to be crucial to the success of the program: a
neutral, non-profit third party who could enforce regulations
without tainting results.
5
'
The ILO, which was created in 1919 after the First World
War, had never, in its almost 90 year history, been responsible for
supervisory, on-ground regulatory functions. 2 Up until this point,
the ILO had acted as a non-governmental legislative branch
negotiating and constructing international labor conventions. 3
However, the reaffirmation at the Doha Ministerial Conference in
2001 by the WTO that the ILO was the "competent" body to deal
with core labor standards had placed it in the difficult position of
needing to take a more proactive hands-on role in the international
labor rights regime.5 4 The ILO needed to demonstrate its ability to
be more than a soft power intermediary between the developed and
underdeveloped nations. This is where the UCTA came in.
After a great deal of debate, and the contemplation of many
different proposals, the ILO's Director-General, Juan Somavia,
finally agreed to undertake regulatory compliance. 5 On May 4 th,
2000, the ILO signed an agreement to handle regulatory compli-
ance of all registered Cambodian textile factories.56 This move
49 See Polaski, supra note 19, at 5.
'o See id.
51 See Kolben, supra note 26, at 81.
52 See EBERE OSIEKE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 3-5 (Martinus Nijhoff 1985) (demonstrating
the founding of the ILO and its original role).
53 Id.
54 See Robert E. Baldwin, Key Challenges Facing the WTO, in DOHA AND
BEYOND: THE FUTURE OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 46, 55 (Mike
Moore ed., 2004).
55 See Kolben, supra note 26, at 100.
56 Polaski, supra note 19, at 6.
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acted as a catalyst for the organization, which soon found itself
moving into a broader range of international regulatory functions. 7
Suddenly, the ILO was the major player on the international labor
rights enforcement and regulatory scene that many had always
hoped.
C. Regulatory Compliance
The regulatory compliance program was established under
the title of the ILO Garment Sector Working Conditions
Improvement Project ("project"); in 2001 the project would change
its name to Better Factories Cambodia (BFC), which it still holds
today.58 The project was funded largely by the U.S. government
from the years 1999 to 2004, with expenditures of nearly $2
million dollars, or approximately $3.50 a worker per year.59 It had
four main objectives: (1) develop and maintain an independent
monitoring system; (2) draft new legislation and regulations to
ensure labor rights protections; (3) increase worker and employer
knowledge of core international labor rights; and, (4) increase
cooperation between workers, employers, and the government to
continue movement towards complying with national and interna-
tional labor standards.
60
In order to facilitate the program, the trade agreement
stated that the ILO regulatory program should include "inter-
nationally recognised core labour standards," which has been
interpreted by the ILO to mean all of their Fundamental
57 See, e.g., Kimberly Ann Elliot, The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor
Standards, 00-6 INT'L ECON. POL'Y BRIEFS 1, 6 (July 2000) (showing that the
same year the UCTA was signed the ILO undertook an enforcement action
against Burma for using forced labor by relying upon a provision of its charter,
Article 33, which allowed penalties to be enforced by member states when ILO
conventions are violated), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/
pbOO-6.pdf.
58 Wells, supra note 4, at 364, 373.
59 Polaski, supra note 16, at 25.
60 Wells, supra note 4, at 364.
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Conventions as well as Cambodian domestic regulations.6 1 So
when instituting the regulatory compliance plan, the ILO drafted
an extensive checklist questionnaire (containing over 500 issues) to
be used by auditors when conducting on-site observations of fac-
tories.62 The items on this checklist are used more as go-bys than
as absolute requirements, as the ILO does not have enforcement
power within another state's sovereign territory. Due to the fact
that they are merely acting as a regulatory scheme coordinator, the
ILO's enforcement abilities are limited to published reports.
However, being that these reports are to be used to determine
whether or not increased quota rights would be offered to the
Cambodian garment industry, the ILO still wields a great deal of
power over the garment industry.
To oversee the project, a tripartite Project Advisory
Committee (PAC) was formed, with an equal representation of 3
agents from the Cambodian government, the Garment Manu-
facturers Association of Cambodia, and the Cambodian trade
unions.63 The PAC does not meet regularly, and has no direct
responsibility for the day-to-day activities of BFC, but is expected
to provide support and guidance in certain specific areas:
evaluation of the ILO monitoring system and its reports,
registration of factories into the program, the implementation of
new procedures for ILO factory visits, and maintaining an open
dialogue between the employers and the unions.
64
In order to truly gauge the successes and failures of the
project, factory involvement and cooperation is essential. The ILO
61 Sibbel & Borrmann, supra note 47, at 239 (quoting ILO, First Synthesis
Report on the Working Conditions Situation in Cambodia's Garment Sector, §
1.1 (Nov. 1, 1001)); see also Kolben, supra note 26, at 93.
62 See Sibbel & Borrman, supra note 47, at 239 (discussing questionnaires
primarily made up of factors from the ILO Fundamental Conventions and the
1997 Cambodia Labor Law Code).
63 ILO, Better Factories Cambodia: Sixteenth Synthesis Report on Working
Conditions in Cambodia's Garment Sector 3 (Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.betterfactories.org/content/documents/1/1 6th%2OSynthesis%2ORepo
rt%/o2O(en).pdf (Mar. 2006).
64 See id.; Sibbel & Borrmann, supra note 47, at 238.
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believed that unless factories were involved with the project of
their own accord, and not due to strict government regulation,
results might be tainted and unreliable. Therefore, it was deter-
mined that factory registration in the program would be volun-
tary.65 However, being that the quota system was based on the
overall performance of the whole country, many worried that a
large portion of non-participants would skew the results and
represent a threat to all producers.66 In addition, this fact worried
many that a free rider problem would develop where a small group
of unregulated factories would benefit from the good faith efforts
of the majority. 67
Realizing how problematic these issues could be, the
Cambodian Ministry of Commerce responded by enacting Prakas
(Ministerial Regulation) 108 on March 28th, 2001 which limited
the availability of export quotas to the U.S. by any non-
participating factory.68 This quickly resulted in complete partici-
pation by all factories, as all factory owners wanted to have
increased access to the U.S. markets. By not directly mandating
involvement, but still facilitating an incentive for participating in
the program, the Cambodian government felt they had found a
happy medium that would quell the free rider concerns.
BFC utilizes a small group of eight carefully selected locals
to undertake all domestic monitoring of the factories. 69 These
monitors are paid very well by Cambodian standards to avoid the
likelihood of bribery and have been specially trained by the ILO to
ensure that their monitoring practices meet international standards
and norms. 70 By utilizing local monitors, the ILO has avoided any
problems with the monitors not speaking the local language
(Khmer) and not being able to meet with workers and unions away
65 Polaski, supra note 19, at 7.
66 id.
67 See id. (explaining that under the free rider problem factories who did not
participate would have an economic advantage over those who did).
68 Sibbel & Borrmann, supra note 47, at 238.
69 See Polaski, supra note 19, at 15.70 id.
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from the workplace.7 ' The monitors have been very successful in
properly administering the program and have been praised by all
parties involved. 2
In order to facilitate and analyze all the results gathered
from the monitors, the ILO produces two types of reports:
confidential factory reports and publicly available "synthesis
reports., 73 The confidential factory reports are written after initial
visits to participating factories and are used solely for internal
monitoring purposes and are not made public.74 The synthesis
reports are shared publicly and detail the ILO's findings on
secondary visits to groups of factories and give a description of
overall compliance results, while also specifically mentioning non-
compliant factories by name.
75
The reasoning behind the two report system is simple: by
sparing factories the shame of being publicly named as labor
violators initially, but posing the threat of being publicly outed in
the Synthesis Reports, factory owners would be scared into quick
and dramatic change. The availability and specificity of the
synthesis reports have been very positive and the ILO has said they
have played a significant role in the U.S. agreeing to annual quota
increases. 76 Also, the availability of the names of non-compliant
factories has been seen as a way of aiding potential corporate
buyers when deciding whether or not to contract with certain
factories.
The project is still on-going in Cambodia under the BFC
despite the end of the MFA. It uses an interactive website to
publicly release its quarterly newsletters, Synthesis Reports, and
update any changes on its policy. 77 It has been seen as a major
71 Id. at 16.72 See id. at 15.
73 Wells, supra note 4, at 364.
74 See id.
75 See id.; see also ILO, supra note 63, at 4.
76 Wells, supra note 4, at 364.
77 See, ILO, Better Factories Cambodia, available at www.betterfactories.org
(showing the status of the BFC program today).
Vol. XXVI
A Lesson from the East
coup for all parties involved and has acted as a case study for many
state's future inclusion of labor provisions within trade agreements
with developing countries.
D. Positive Results of the UCTA
Cambodia saw some amazing results during the UCTA. It
became the first underdeveloped state in the world to achieve over
$1 billion in yearly exports, with the garment industry representing
78eighty percent of that total. During the first six years of the
UCTA, Cambodia's apparel exports quintupled to $1.9 billion
dollars, with employment levels nearly tripling from 79,000 to
270,000 workers.79 During this same span, Cambodia saw an
influx of foreign investment. Companies, such as Disney, which
had once left Cambodia due to labor rights concerns, returned after
an eight year absence from the Cambodian market due to the ILO
regulatory project.80 This rise in production output and foreign
investment helped the minimum monthly wage in the apparel
sector ($45) rise above the average monthly household income in
rural areas ($40).81 A World Bank survey of international buyers
demonstrated that Cambodia's labor standards compliance placed
them ahead of all of their regional competitors.82 By nearly all
outside accounts, BFC had been more successful than anticipated.
The first twenty-eight factories to be monitored under this
system showed that 32.5% of ILO suggestions were implemented
after the first visit, with 43.5% being implemented after a second
visit; similar average rates of implementation have been noted
78 Polaski, supra note 19, at 15.
79 See Wells, supra note 4, at 367-68.
s See id.
s Polaski, supra note 19, at 11.
82 Foreign Investment Advisory Service [FIAS], Cambodia: Corporate Social
Responsibility and the Apparel Sector Buyer Survey Results, available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Cambodia+Buyer+
Survey+Report+Final/$FILE/Cambodia+Buyer+Survey+Report+Final.pdf (Dec.
2004).
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since these initial findings.83 It should be mentioned though, that
these numbers represent averages, and thus, do not accurately
represent a specific factory-to-factory analysis. Nonetheless, these
figures still demonstrate an upward improvement of labor
standards within the industry.
Internally, BFC hailed the project as a success. In its
Sixteenth Synthesis report, BFC found some very positive results:
forced labor in factories was found to be virtually non-existent,
pregnant workers were no longer summarily dismissed, employ-
ment of underage workers had been largely vanquished, eighty-
four percent of factories paid workers at the mandatory minimum
wage, over half of the factories did not instill mandatory overtime,
and nearly half of the factories had provided some sort of personal
protective equipment to workers. 84 While these changes are still
quite small in comparison to most developed states standards, they
do show a distinct improvement from factory conditions before the
UCTA. Individual workers rights are beginning to gain respect,
workplace standards have risen considerably, and there is a greater
deal of dialogue between management and unions. Even with this
noticeable improvement, the ILO still recognized the need for an
even greater and more sustained growth for the project to truly be
considered a success.
V. AFTER THE UCTA
A. Initial Concerns
With the end of the UCTA in 2004, a great deal of specu-
lation arose as to how the Cambodian garment industry would fare.
The threat of increased competition by large-scale manufacturing
states, such as China and India, posed a major danger to
Cambodia's continued economic growth.85 Many of these quota-
83 Sibbel & Borrmann, supra note 47, at 242-43.
84 ILO, supra note 63, at 6-7.
85 See generally, Polaski, supra note 19, at 9.
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limited states had not implemented similar labor protections within
their own borders and did not enforce already existing labor
standards, and for these reasons, would be able to offer lower
prices. Cambodia was relying on their good faith efforts to reform
its county's labor standards, and the promise of many corporations
to continue their business, to help them maintain their relevant
position in the world market. As the president of the Garment
Manufacturers Association of Cambodia said in 2002, "[o]nce we
started talking to buyers, [and] looked at American consumer
habits, we realized that we had a comparative advantage. More-
over, our only chance to survive in Cambodia was to build on the
image of safe sourcing. Otherwise, we'd lose to price
competition.
86
With the new market pressures sure to cause immediate
effects on the manufacturing industry, the Cambodian government
sought to maintain the one comparative advantage its factories still
held over competitors: fair labor standards. The Cambodian
factories offered corporate and state buyers increased savings on
expensive outside inspectors and a renewed positive public image.
In the age of Corporate Codes of Conduct and international
goodwill, Cambodian factories were offering a premium that many
of their competitors could not. In order to sustain the program, the
Cambodian government reached out to many different corporations
and international organizations for funding. 87 Through consider-
able effort, Cambodia was able to shore up investment by many
private corporations, including the World Bank and Agence France
de Developpement, in order to extend BFC until 2009.
88
Currently, the Cambodian government, along with the
domestic labor unions and employers, are working towards
nationalizing the project into a Cambodian domestic institution by
86 Sibbel & Borrman, supra note 19, at 245 (citing Regina Abrami, Worker
Rights and Global Trade: The U.S.-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement 12,
HARV. Bus. SCH. CASE 703-34 (2003)).
87 See Wells, supra note 4, at 373.
88 Id. If Cambodia wished to keep BFC after 2009, it was decided that it would
be up to Cambodia to fund all of BFC's practices.
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January 1, 2009.89 The plan is to use BFC as a way for Cambodia
to flaunt its domestic factories compliance records in hope of
garnering more foreign contracts. Cambodia believes that by
putting greater emphasis on electronic media, and more specifi-
cally, the uploading of factory specific reports online, the industry
will realize greater domestic revenue from corporate buyers who
will be more comfortable dealing with Cambodian factories. 90 As
the Cambodian Minister of Commerce has said, "We are extending
our labor standards beyond the end of the quotas because we know
that is why we continue to have buyers. If we didn't respect the
unions and the labor standards, we would be killing the goose that
lays the golden eggs."
91
B. Cambodian Output Following the UCTA
The increased level of foreign competition following the
end of the MFA agreement has not seemed to significantly alter
factory compliance levels within Cambodia. 92 Thus far, the overall
conclusion from the synthesis reports reflects a marked improve-
ment in the working standards for the Cambodian textile
industry. 93 However, the reports do show a noteworthy level of
non-compliance in certain areas: ensuring workers rights, freedom
from anti-union discrimination, minimum wage requirements, and
voluntary overtime restrictions.94 To date, "over a third of the
ILO's almost 2500 suggestions have been implemented, in whole
or in part." 95 This level of compliance is still well below the levels
that many hoped the project would achieve and shows the need for
continued efforts in improvement.
89 Sibbel & Borrmann, supra note 47, at 245.
90 Id.
9' Elizabeth Becker, Cambodia's Garment Makers Hold Off a Vast Chinese
Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2005, at CI.
92 See id.
93 Sibbel & Borrmann, supra note 47, at 242.
94 id.
95 Wells, supra note 4, at 371.
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While the overall change in Cambodia from the pre-UCTA
years to its current state is quite remarkable, there is still a great
deal of change that needs to be done. However, it is important to
remember that factory compliance levels have seemed to remain
stable even with the end of the MFA. Being that standards have
remained relatively constant, one can assume BFC is still having
some success in ensuring a minimum level of factory compliance.
The thought is that with a continuation of the program past 2009,
compliance with core labor rights will only continue to grow.
Also significant to note is that since 2004 all major econo-
mic categories tied to Cambodian garment exports have either
increased or stayed relatively stable.96 In the year 2005, the
garment industry saw its exports to the U.S. and the European
Union (EU) increase, employment levels rise, and wages remain
relatively stable; with economic projections showing these gains to
either increase or remain constant for the near future.
97
One major reason for these sustained increases is due to the
U.S. and the EU adopting safeguard protections against Chinese
imports.98 Under China's 2001 accession agreement to the WTO,
member states, under certain circumstances, have the right to enact
safeguard measures to limit Chinese textile imports until 2008.9'
To avoid the inconvenience of integrating comprehensive safe-
guard measures, the U.S. and EU reached separate bi-lateral
agreements with China in 2005 that limited its textile importation
in a manner similar to the MFA, but restricted less products and
allowed larger quotas.'00  Currently, over forty percent of
Cambodia's exports are in import categories in which there are
96 See ILO, Better Factories Cambodia, The End of Quotas: Impact on
Cambodia's Export Garment Industry (July 2006), available at http://www.
betterfactories.org/content/documents/The%20End%20of/20Quotas%20-
%20Jul%2005%20(En).pdf.
9' See id
98 See U.S. Dep't of Agric., The World Bids Farewell to the Multifiber Agree-
ment, AMBER WAVES, Feb. 2006, avaialble at http://www.ers.usda.gov/amber
waves/february06/features/feature2.htm.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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import limits for the Chinese.' 0' This fact demonstrates how
Cambodia's strong effort in establishing, and maintaining, BFC
has helped to foster a close and beneficial relationship with the
U.S.
Cambodia's economy is surpassing forecasters' expecta-
tions following the end of the MFA. Based on current market
figures, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its
prediction on Cambodia's gross domestic product from 2.3% to
6% due to continued success in the garment industry and limited
Chinese interference.' 0 2 Also, the Economic institute of Cambodia
said that a growth of ten to twenty percent in 2005 for the garment
industry was a very realistic figure if current standards and trends
hold true.' 0
3
Overall, the economic position of the Cambodian textile
market has seemed to remain fluid due to its ability to provide
legitimate labor standards statistics to corporate and state pur-
chasers. Many factories have flaunted this advantage by allowing
buyers the ability to access their monitoring reports online from the
ILO. They have focused on the transparent and legitimate
environment the BFC has brought to the Cambodian garment
industry. While one cannot be sure of what will happen in 2009
when China is no longer affected by the U.S. and EU safeguards, it
seems likely that the close bonds made between Cambodia and
these two trading powerhouses will have entrenched Cambodia in
their markets.
VI. LESSONS FROM THE UCTA
There are many useful lessons that can be taken away from
the implementation of the UCTA. Its revolutionary nature,
combined with its success, has established a framework by which
other similar agreements can be structured. However, like any new
and innovative design, it is still a work in process. In order to learn
10' See ILO, Better Factories Cambodia, supra note 96, at 1.
102 id.
103 id.
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from both the successes and failures of the UCTA, states need to
closely examine the results of the agreement. For the purposes of
this article, we will focus on three of the most important lessons
from the agreement.
A. Positive Incentives
The first important lesson from the UCTA was its ability to
successfully link trade privileges to labor rights through a positive
incentive program. Up until the UCTA, all labor provisions in U.S.
trade agreements had operated under negative incentive programs
which linked decreased labor standards to negative economic
consequences.'04 The goal of these negative incentive provisions
was not "to utilize them per se, but rather to establish a disin-
centive or punishment that is adequate to deter a party from failing
to carry out its obligations, and thus to encourage voluntary
compliance."' 105 After watching the results of these provisions for
some time, the U.S. realized this type of incentive program did not
foster the kind of change that it was seeking. Rather than
motivating states to improve their labor standards directly, it led
them to merely maintain their standards so that they would not face
any further decreases. The U.S. saw the UCTA as a means of
testing to see if tying in positive incentives would produce greater
results.' 
06
The UCTA's positive incentive program was successful
because of its structure. It offered additional market access, via the
quota increase, to the Cambodian garment industry for demon-
strating it had reached certain levels of compliance with national
and international labor standards.' 0 7 This provided an incentive to
both the Cambodian government, and factory owners, to take a
proactive effort in improving standards rather than following the
status quo. This made the improvement of labor conditions and
104 Polaski, supra note 19, at 5, 17.
105 Polaski, supra note 16, at 20.
106 Id at 16.
107 See id. at 21.
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standards more politically appealing to Cambodian government
officials and factory owners, and thus, more likely to be imple-
mented and sustainable. Rather than seeing resistance, the
Cambodian garment industry actually saw change evolve quickly.
Cambodian officials developed an open dialogue with labor
unions, and convinced factory owners of the overall benefits to
their industry if they adhered more strictly to international labor
regulations. After demonstrating initial financial benefits
throughout the first year of BFC, the officials gained wide-spread
factory owner support as well. 0 8 This meant that prolonged change
became a staple of the UCTA because of the fear of losing access
to the American market.
Positive incentive programs are a strategy that many
scholars, like Sandra Polaski of the Carnegie Institute, have
publicly promoted. 10 9 The basic mantra behind this theory is that
by compelling states to act on their own accord, one will see more
significant and immediate changes occur within that state. One of
the many complaints against negative incentive provisions has
been that it leads many states into maintaining the status quo. The
status quo is seen as a safe haven where states can reside with little
risk just by maintaining the same ineffective policies. In a positive
incentive program, states that are serious about gaining economic
advantages must encourage domestic change in order to benefit.
The process of instituting positive incentives into trade
agreements is not difficult. States can easily add positive incentive
labor rights provisions into trade agreements without causing any
real disruption within the global market." 0 The UCTA is a
roadmap of how states can utilize positive incentive provisions in a
way that both benefits their own domestic workers, while also
helping the international system shift towards a more compliant
international labor rights regime.
'08 Int'l Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Cambodia: Increasing Pressure on
Trade Union Rights, TRADE UNION WORLD REPORT, April 2005, at 5, available
at http://www.icftu.org/www/PDF/LMSrapportCambodiaEN.pdf
'09 See, e.g., Polaski, supra note 19.
"0 See id, at 22-23.
Vol. XXVI
A Lesson from the East
The key, however, will primarily rely on a consensus
among all states that the "occasional short-term costs [of instituting
a similar program] are outweighed by long-term gains, that the
deferred gratification will exceed the immediate.""' Smaller
underdeveloped states will need to see how the positive aspects of
increased labor standards can offset the initial and immediate costs
to their industries. This will require an increased effort by the
global community against comparative advantage and its conse-
quences. It is only through this type of international cooperation
and involvement that labor rights will ever be adequately
protected.
B. ILO Success
The ILO's results in Cambodia have had many lasting
effects on its garment industry. First, it helped to reestablish multi-
national corporations' faith in Cambodia's ability to regulate their
garment industry. 1 2 Branded multi-national corporations are very
concerned about their corporate image. In today's marketplace, a
company's good will is something that cannot be ignored. Whether
its protestors, politicians, or consumer advocates, there is always
someone waiting to tell consumers why they should not buy from a
certain corporation." 3 This fear has led many large corporations to
establish Corporate Codes of Conduct to demonstrate to the public
that they are conscious of how their actions affect workers'
rights. 14 However, these codes effectiveness are limited to the
"' David E. Skaggs, How Can Parliamentary Participation in WTO-Rule-
Making and Democratic Control be Made More Effective in the WTO? A United
States Congressional Perspective, in REFORMING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
411 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 2005).
112 Int'l Confederation of Free Trade Unions, supra note 108, at 5.
113 Id. (explaining how 86% of a 2004 World Bank survey of the 15 largest
textile purchasers from Cambodia felt consumer's views of labor standards as
important as prices, quality, and delivery times).
"14 Adelle Blackett, Codes of Corporate Conduct and the Labour Regulatory
State in Developing Countries, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY
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corporation's influence on, and oversight of, their various
contracted factories; which very often is minimal at best."
5
In order to prove their adherence to these codes, many
corporations have set up regulatory schemes in which they send
private inspectors into factories to observe their compliance with
core labor standards. 116 However, even with these efforts, these
inspectors have proved generally ineffective.117 This ineffective-
ness can be tied to a combination of many reasons: the inspectors
not understanding the local languages, the factory visits occurring
on a pre-determined, announced date, and the fact that inspectors
usually do not conduct worker interviews away from the factory or
factory management."18 All of these factors limit the likelihood that
these inspections are representing accurate and truthful results.
Also, there is often a lack of consistency in how these
factories are audited. The entire field of social auditing is still in its
infancy and an industry leader, or widely accepted methodology,
has yet to be discovered.'l 9 These factors have caused private
monitoring programs to remain, at best, inconsistent. Without a
proven and accepted method of conducting these on-site inspec-
tions, corporations certainly can not expect the type of honest and
forthcoming results that are required to determine if a factory is
labor compliant. These obvious weaknesses in the private inspec-
tion industry have helped Cambodia separate itself from other low-
cost textile manufacturing states due to its already existent and
reliable regulatory compliance scheme.
By utilizing the ILO for factory inspections, corporate
entities have been able to save a great deal of money by not having
to pay costly foreign auditing firms to regulate their contracted
STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 125
(John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004).
"t5 See Frederick B. Jonassen, A Baby-Step to Global Labor Reform: Corporate
Codes of Conduct and the Child, 17 MINN. J. INT'L L. 7, 47 (2008).
116 Polaksi, supra note 19, at 6.
117 id.
118 id.
"9 Id. at 15-16.
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factories; this financial benefit has helped many corporations
accept the higher costs per product. Some corporations-like
Sears, Kmart, and Wal-Mart-have ceased their own monitoring
programs in Cambodia and rely strictly on BFC. 120 The ILO offers
corporate buyers a level of reliability and certainty that the private
auditors never could. Now, the likelihood of any of these
contracted factories facing any major labor abuse scandals is less
likely. Also, even if a scandal was to happen, it would be the ILO
that would take the brunt of the blame, not the corporations.
Corporate executives can feel secure in the ILO's ability to
regulate their contracted factories and allow the corporations to do
what they do best: watch their own bottom line.
Second, the ILO regulatory regime has demonstrated a
greater level of transparency and legitimacy that could never be
found through any domestic regulatory scheme. The ILO is the
most respected organization in the realm of labor rights. Through
its creation and adherence to its Fundamental Conventions, the
ILO has gained an unsullied reputation that offered a "form of
reputation risk insurance to global apparel retailers.... ,,121 It is this
reputation that gives Cambodia's domestic reform efforts a sense
of legitimacy that otherwise would not be present. Individuals can
look to the ILO's involvement and know that the actions being
undertaken are not merely skin-deep. Positive results will not be
seen as motive driven and can be applauded without concern.
Also, before the UCTA, states and private corporations
would never allow the results of their labor audits to be public
because of concern that the results may cause public outrage. At
least in this instance, positive or negative, results will be shared
with the public.
120 Sibbel & Borrmann, supra note 47, at 245.
121 Polaski, supra note 19, at 9.
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VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR BUILDING UPON THE
UCTA MODEL
The UCTA, while quite successful, is still a work-in-
progress. While hailed as a success, there have been a number of
complaints about specific aspects of the agreement. In order to
alleviate these problems in the future, there are many possible
improvements that could be undertaken.. Among the many possi-
bilities, three suggestions seem the most obvious: (1) requiring
states to implement domestic legislation to force all affected
factories to be part of the compliance project; (2) allowing the ILO
to release complete factory results of ILO inspections to workers
and labor unions; and, (3) tagging product exports as ILO
compliant in order to attract more mid-level corporate buyers.
A. Domestic Legislation
Under the UCTA, Cambodian factories were not required
to register and take part in the ILO compliance regime. 122
Realizing this as a potential problem, the Cambodian government
passed Prakas 108 to guarantee full compliance by all factories.
23
The voluntary feature in the factory compliance program could
have been a much larger problem than it was since the quota
incentives were tied to state-wide compliance, not on a factory-by-
factory basis. 124 In future agreements, it seems unlikely that a
similar program would be implemented on a factory-by-factory
basis due to the major costs and administrative problems that
would occur from doing so. Therefore, one would still have
concern over the possibility of a free rider problem. That is why if
the program is not going to be instituted on an individual basis, it is
important that participating states pass domestic legislation to
ensure full compliance.
122 See id. at 7.
123 Sibbel & Borrmann, supra note 47, at 238.
124 Polaski, supra note 16, at 7.
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In many states, especially those with corrupt and unstable
governments, it seems likely that it would be difficult to enforce
compliance. Without mandatory compliance in these states, many
factories would refuse to comply in order to gain an advantage
over their domestic competitors. Those who did comply would be
constantly worried about the non-compliant factories and the
sacrifice to their bottom line. In turn, the compliant factories would
begin to realize losses to their business and would begin removing
themselves from the program; reinstituting the race to the bottom.
This overall effect is the antithesis of what the trade agreement is
trying to instill and would only drain its effectiveness.
While these provisions would certainly bring about
sovereignty issues, as there would be larger, powerful states
affecting the domestic politics of smaller states, it would still be in
the best interest of both. By passing this legislation, the smaller
state can show that they are committed to enforcing the provision
of the trade agreement and receiving the positive incentives, and'
the larger state will feel more secure. This process will foster a
more symbiotic relationship between the two states and help make
the transition to similar future agreements easier. States concerned
about sovereignty issues can simply refuse to sign onto trade
agreements that utilize these provisions, and thus, avoid any
concerns they may have.
B. Administrative Policies
Certain administrative actions have been undertaken in the
management of BFC that do not necessarily reflect full trans-
parency. The Chief Technical Advisor (CTA), the head of BFC, is
in charge of developing and maintaining the ILO inspection
checklist. 25 Further, the CTA is responsible for compiling and
publishing all synthesis reports. 126 As such, the CTA has discretion
on how and when results will be disseminated. It is this discretion
125 See Kolben, supra note 26, at 10 1-03.
126 Id. at 102-03.
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that has led to a very questionable administrative policy limiting
disclosure of compliance results to labor unions and workers.
BFC required that "once the [CTA] has approved the
report, the monitors will discuss it with the employer and workers
in an attempt to conciliate and reach agreement."' 127 However, at
the beginning of the project, the CTA decided that it would not
share the results of the factory visits with workers due to a fear that
they might use the information to strike and cause unrest
throughout the garment industry.12 8 The CTA justified its decision
by stating that strikes would cause irreparable harm to the project
and its goals. Whether these strikes would actually occur, or if the
results could lead to increased negotiation between the unions and
employers, never seemed to be considered by the CTA. The
CTA's refusal to completely share factory audit results frustrated
many workers and their union representatives who began to
publicly complain about the decision. Eventually, the CTA decided
that it would allow partial disclosure to the workers, but still
withhold certain key results. 1
29
It is not uncommon for a certain level of discretion to be
allowed for any controlling executive. However, when one
individual is allowed a high level of discretion in the imple-
mentation of key parts of a project, it leaves open the possibility of
unwanted and unforeseen outcomes. While no one is accusing the
CTA of improperly doing their job, one could argue that it was
being too cautious with its decisions; with this caution possibly
jeopardizing the legitimacy of the project. In order for this project
to garner complete support, labor organizers need to feel that they
are being properly included. If workers' perceive that the project is
siding too heavily with the employers, a great distrust could occur
that would completely disenfranchise the workers.
There is no doubt that leaders' need a certain level of
discretion, but that discretion needs to be limited to those things
that would not alter the purpose of the project. Under the UCTA,
127Id. at 104.
128 Id.
129 See id.
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PACs were formed in order to guarantee a more cooperative
atmosphere between the government, employees, and employ-
ers. 130 However, it is obvious that this decision by the CTA
overwhelmingly benefited the employers over the employees. In
this respect, it is obvious that the CTA's decision was contrary to
one of the key underlying motives of the UCTA, and as such,
contrary to the entire essence of the agreement as well. Also, the
fact that there was no dispute resolution mechanism present makes
this situation that much more problematic.
Generally, in most trade agreements there exists some type
of dispute resolution mechanism where individuals can lodge
official complaints and have their concerns heard.13 ' In this case,
there was no such mechanism for the union workers to invoke in
order to complain about the CTA's decision. Therefore, it seems
necessary for future drafts to include a dispute resolution
mechanism or body to hear any problems that might arise. The
actual mechanism that would best fit this type of agreement is hard
to initially ascertain, but could be similar to the WTO's current
panel structure. Under its panel structure, a panel of member states
hears complaints and levies a decision which can be appealed. 132 In
this situation, instead of using member states, the panel could be
represented by PAC members who could come to either a final,
binding conclusion or an appealable decision that could be heard
by the Director General of the ILO for a final decision.
Even if this exact dispute mechanism was not used, any
other variation would still be a welcomed addition to the current
structure. As it currently stands, the lack of a legitimate dispute
resolution mechanism may jeopardize future uses of the UCTA
structure.
130 See ILO, supra note 63, at 3.
131 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Can the WTO Dispute Settlement
System Deal with Competition Disputes?, in REFORMING THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 535, 544 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 2005).132 id.
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C. Tagging
An additional factor that could be incorporated into future
trade agreements would be the addition of tags to all products
produced at ILO compliant factories. The UCTA was initially
successful because it helped Cambodia gain an advantage over
other states who were constrained by the MFA. With the dissolu-
tion of the MFA, and the likelihood of a more saturated market,
states implementing UCTA type of agreements need some other
types of incentives to guarantee future success.
Following the end of the MFA, it has been shown in many
instances that the transparency involved in Cambodia's factories
has helped to entice corporate buyers to either maintain contracts
with, or to move contracts to Cambodian factories even when their
products might be more costly.133 However, these entities that have
chosen to affect their bottom line are generally the larger multi-
national corporations who represent a smaller percentage of the
entire international market.' 34 In order to help attract smaller mid-
level corporations to utilize factories that are labor compliant, new
enticements need to be included.
One possible suggestion would be for the ILO to institute a
program where compliant factories could include a tag with every
product demonstrating its compliance with ILO standards. Doing
this would represent a minor cost, maybe pennies on the dollar, but
offer smaller corporate buyers a greater premium than a small per
item discount. The tags produced for these products could possibly
even be subsidized by the contracting state parties, which would
make the concept even more advantageous for factory owners. It
would allow the ILO to further tie itself to the international labor
regime, while guaranteeing a greater level of legitimacy for all
factories involved.
133 See Polaski, supra note 16, at 22.
134 See Wells, supra note 4, at 368 (demonstrating that it is larger corporations
who are entering the Cambodian garment market due to an increased labor
standards reputation).
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The International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
has implemented a system of standards for running a business
known as ISO 9001.135 Under ISO 9001, any factory that received
an ISO audit and certification can publicly advertise itself as being
ISO certified.' 36 This process has helped many companies add
business because of the security that comes from the knowledge
that they are dealing with a entity that has a stable organizational
structure in place. Using this model, garment factories could easily
agree to become verified as labor compliant to guarantee certifica-
tion. Once certified, these factories could begin to actively
advertise and market themselves as being "ILO certified" in order
to be more competitive within the international market.
Similarly, the Rugmark Foundation has been innovative in
its use of tagging to demonstrate the legitimacy of carpets pro-
duced at looms that it has independently audited. 37 Every loom
attaches a label to each carpet it produces in order to show that
child labor has not been used in their production process.138 In
order to further guarantee the legitimacy of the products, and to
avoid counterfeit labels, each label is numbered so its origin can be
traced back to the loom at which it was produced.
139
The ILO could use the Rugmark example as a way of
further promoting the international labor rights movement by
requiring all ILO inspected factories to tag their products with
some sort of mark that indicates it as ILO compliant. This would
help internationalize the cause by making consumers more aware
of international labor standards. This effort would open these
factories to a wider breath of markets and could possibly lead to a
greater surge of support for these types of factories and the cor-
porations that contract them. As the German ambassador to
'35See International Organization of Standardization, About ISO, http://www.
iso.org/iso/about.htm.
136 See id
131 See Rugmark Foundation, Child-Labor-Free Certification, www.rugmark.org
(last visited April 12, 2008).
138 See id.
9 See id
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Cambodia noted, labor standards are now of "the utmost impor-
tance for the image of trading partners..." 140
By flaunting their ILO compliance, states can strengthen
their garment industries' attractiveness to Western purchasers. In a
time when many consumer organizations have established boycotts
of corporations like Wal-Mart, other businesses can point to ILO
compliance to show that their products are not being produced in
violation of international labor standards.' 14 This is one of the few
ways to ensure that the race to the bottom does not further
denigrate developing markets and their workers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The UCTA represents a revolutionary way for states to deal
with labor issues within the international market. It forces
developing states to emphasize responsibility and accountability
within their domestic labor codes, while still offering a positive
incentive to become compliant. Even though the UCTA represents
a very small sample of the $350 billon dollar garment industry, it
does demonstrate a broader degree of potential importance. 142 It
shows that these types of agreements can be successful for both
developing and developed states without negatively affecting labor
standards. It also demonstrates that this type of trade structure
would not be limited directly to textile manufacturing, but could be
spread to other industries.
Further, the UCTA has shown that the ILO is ready to take
on a more hands-on, global role in the regulatory compliance and
enforcement of international labor standards. With a more active
ILO involved, global governance of labor rights is sure to take on a
more important role within the international system in the future.
140 See ILO, Strong Growth in 2005, 4 BETTER FACTORIES CAMBODIA Q.
NEWSL. I (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.betterfactories.org/content/
documents/I /Better/20Factories%20Newsletter/o2ONo.4%20(en).pdf.
141 See. e.g., I world Communication, Boycott International, http://www.
I worldcommunication.org/Walmart.htm (last visited April 12, 2008).
142 Wells, supra note 4, at 376.
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States will no longer remain ambivalent and cautious towards labor
laws and will be forced to take more pro-active measures to
guarantee that domestic codes conform to the international
standards.
Based on the analysis presented herein, it is obvious that
enactment of a similar UCTA model can have long-term,
meaningful effects. In the future, one can expect to see states
beginning to diversify and expand the UCTA structure to different
industries and to see an increased use of positive incentive
provisions in trade agreements. Also, one can expect new and
innovative ideas to be added to these provisions in order to
overcome states concerns with keeping industry prices competi-
tive. With ILO support, and international pressure, it would be of
no shock if these new agreements eventually became the new
status quo for the international labor regime.

